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BEKINS MOVING & STORAGE
COMPANY-DENIAL OF CERTIFICATION TO
UNIONS PRACTICING INVIDIOUS
DISCRIMINATION
Since the inception of federal labor laws,' the task of maintaining
the tenuous bargaining power relationship between employee and
employer has been primarily within the purview of the National
Labor Relations Board.2 Though the main concern of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) initially centered upon ob-
taining economic necessities for individual employees3 through the
benefits of organization, respect for employees' civil rights and free-
dom to enjoy such benefits has come to demand increasing NLRB
consideration.4 The Board's decision in Bekins Moving & Storage
Co.,5 that under certain circumstances certification6 could be denied
to a union practicing invidious discrimination7 in its membership
policies, represents a critical juncture in decisions affecting the re-
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, as amended, Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, §§ 701-707,
73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-68 (1970).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 160 (1970); see Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of America,
Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 166 (1971).
3 E.g., J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
E.g., Alden Press, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 86 L.R.R.M. 1605 (1974); Bell &
Howell Co., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 87 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1974); Defender Security &
Investigation Servs., Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 86 L.R.R.M. 1490 (1974); Grants
Furniture Plaza, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 87 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1974); El Diario Pub-
lishing Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 965 (1955).
211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974).
Certification is the final approval by the N.L.R.B. of a representative elected
by the majority of a group of employees to be the bargaining representative of those
employees. The procedures leading to such an election and provision for certification
are contained in 29 U.S.C. § 159(c). For the benefits accruing to a representative
through certification, see note 21 infra.
I Invidious discrimination is defined as discrimination which is inherently sus-
pect, and therefore subject to close judicial scrutiny. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 682 (1973). To constitute "invidious" discrimination the basis of the discrim-
ination must relate to characteristics determined solely by the accident of birth which
are unrelated to non-suspect characteristics of intelligence, physical disability, or skill.
Id. at 686-87. The Supreme Court has characterized discrimination on the basis of race,
alienage, and national origin as invidious discrimination. Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (race);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (race); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 499 (1954) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948) (national
origin-race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (national origin-
race).
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sponsibility of unions to refrain from practices denying organizational
rights to employees on the basis of race, national origin, or alienage.
In Bekins, the NLRB stated for the first time that it would con-
sider objections to the certification of a union, after its election as the
employees' bargaining representative,8 upon a prima facie showing
that the union discriminated on the basis of race, national origin, or
alienage in its membership policies A majority of the Board'" agreed
that the NLRB was proscribed by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment from certifying a union found guilty of such practices."
Additionally, two members of the Board stated that certification
should be denied where evidence revealed a union "to have a propens-
ity to fail fairly to represent employees.' 2 Thus, the Board's analysis
outlined two distinct violations which may trigger a denial of certifi-
cation.
The first violation centers upon the denial of union membership
to an employee on the basis of invidious discrimination. A majority
of the Board considered such union action if condoned through certi-
fication by the NLRB a due process violation of the fifth amendment.
The Board stated that as an agency of the federal government it
cannot bestow the benefits of a federal statute upon one engaged in
such discriminatory practices.' 3 The dissenting opinion stated that
denial of union membership on discriminatory grounds was not in
any way a constitutional issue meriting denial of certification.
Rather, the dissenting members maintained that proper remedies to
rectify membership discrimination were found in specific post-
certification procedures under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'1
86 L.R.R.M. at 1325.
Id. at 1325, 1329.
,The Board consists of five members appointed by the President by and with the
consent of the Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1970). The majority, in regard to the due
process proscription on the Board's actions, consisted of three members of the present
Board: Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins in the majority opinion, and Member
Kennedy in the concurring opinion.
" 86 L.R.R.M. at 1325, 1329.
" Id. at 1326. Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins expressed this opinion.
'3 86 L.R.R.M. at 1325, 1329.
The dissenting opinion stated:
We dissent. We do so, even though we neither approve nor con-
done discriminatory practices on the part of unions, because we be-
lieve that withholding certification in the circumstances indicated is
neither required by the Constitution nor permitted by the provisions
of the Act [NLRA] ....
. . [lt is important to note that certification of a union as an
exclusive representative not only gives the union the statutory right
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The second violation concerned a union's failure to represent
fairly employees. Default in this responsibility would constitute a
breach of the union's duty of fair representation. 5 Two members of
the Board believed a breach of the duty of fair representation to be a
constitutional violation requiring denial of certification."8 A majority
of the Board, however, did not agree with this interpretation. Rather,
it stated that the duty of fair representation was statutory under the
NLRA,' 7 and that any breach of that duty was ripe for consideration
only after certification. 8 Therefore, a majority of the Board, formed
by the concurring and dissenting members, did not consider any vio-
lation of such a duty in regard to race, sex, alienage, or national origin
as a basis for denying certification. The two dissenting members of
the Board reasoned, as they had with regard to possible membership
discrimination, that the proper way to rectify discrimination in repre-
to bargain for the employees, it also imposes the obligation upon the
union fairly to represent all employees ....
[ .. The certification of a union . . . operates to create the neces-
sary condition for permitting the sanction of law and government to
run against the offending practices ...
• . .[W]e reject the argument that Board action which will operate
to clothe Petitioner with a statutory ... responsibility, vis-a-vis the
employees it represents, somehow and in some way contravenes the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Id. at 1332-33. See also note 20 infra.
11 The duty of fair representation constitutes the responsibility of an exclusive
bargaining representative to represent fairly all employees regardless of the racial,
sexual, or ethnic status of those employees. 86 L.R.R.M. at 1326, 1330-31, 1332-33.
" Id. at 1326.
'7 Id. at 1330-31, 1333. The duty of fair representation is stated to be implicit in §
9(a) of the NLRA. 29 US.C. § 159(a) (1970). See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177
(1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953). Section 9(a) provides
that the representative designated or selected by a majority of a group of employees
shall be the exclusive representative for such employees. Due to the exclusive status
of the representative, a reciprocal duty of fairly representing all employees is implied.
See text accompanying notes 30-33 infra.
"1 86 L.R.R.M. at 1331, 1332-33. The dissenting opinion stated that the duty of
fair representation "may be" or "possibly" is constitutional as well as statutory, but
only after certification. In the context of Benkins, the dissent, Members Fanning and
Penello, did not believe that the duty applied because the union in question was not
certified. Id. at 1332-33. A violation of the duty could not logically be used to deny
certification, for the duty was not established until certification occurred.
The concurring opinion, which with the dissenting opinion formed the- majority
on this issue, believed the duty of fair representation to be always statutory in nature,
even after certification. Therefore, constitutional issues never emerged from a violation
of such a duty. Id. at 1330-31. The concurring opinion appears to be correct in its
interpretation that the duty of fair representation is always statutory. See text accom-
panying notes 110-43 infra.
" 86 L.R.R.M. at 1330, 1332-33.
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sentation policies was provided in specific post-certification proce-
dures .20
In view of the disagreement within the Board as to the constitu-
tional or non-constitutional nature of membership and representa-
tion discrimination and in view of the import of the decision to future
organizational and personal right controversies, Bekins Moving &
Storage Co. merits careful scrutiny and analysis. When applied to a
union found guilty of membership discrimination on the basis of race,
alienage, or national origin, the decision effectively prevents such a
union from exercising the prerogatives which would be given to it as
a certified representative.2 ' The possibility of denying a union such
benefits will almost certainly lead to increased employer challenges
to union certification on the basis of alleged discrimination. 2  Also,
for minority employees seeking to exercise the right of self-
organization s and to be represented fairly by their bargaining repre-
sentative, the decision in Bekins portends serious consequences.
In Bekins, a charge of race and sex discrimination against the
union, Local 390 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, was
made by the employer, Bekins Moving & Storage Co., of Florida, Inc.,
at a pre-election hearing. 24 The basis of the membership discrimina-
' Id. at 1332. See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78
Stat. 253, as amended, Act of September 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378,
662, as amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
86 Stat. 103, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Supp. m, 1973).
2 The N.L.R.B. stated in its 1973 Annual Report that certification affords the
statutory benefits of stability, security, and permanency to the bargaining relationship
and prevents challenges by other unions to the majority status of the certified union
for a period of one year. 38 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 56 (1973). See General Box Co., 82
N.L.R.B. 678, 680-82 (1949).
" The fact that increased employer challenges to union certification would result
from the possibility of denying certification benefits to a union is already evident. See
cases cited at note 4 supra.
The right of employees to organize, form, join, or assist a labor organization is
set forth in § 7 of the N.L.R.A. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
24 The basic purposes of a pre-election hearing are to determine whether an elec-
tion of a bargaining representative is warranted, and also to determine the appropriate
units for any subsequent elections. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970). Section 159 provides
for a pre-election hearing when the Board has reasonable cause to believe that a
question of representation exists. The tenor of such a hearing is non-adversary and
informal. Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 706 (1945). But the
employer's charge is made with adverse intentions to deny the union's placement on
the ballot for election. See Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86
L.R.R.M. 1323, 1324 (1974). The Board does not consider the pre-election hearing to
be the appropriate proceeding for consideration of such contentions by the employer.
Id. at 1328. See also Defender Security & Investigation Servs., Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. No.
23, 86 L.R.R.M. 1490 (1974); Alden Press, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 86 L.R.R.M. 1605
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tion charge was the apparent disparity between the percentages of
Spanish-surnamed and female members in the union and the percen-
tages of those two groups in the available labor force in the surround-
ing area.5 According to the employer, these disparities pointed to the
union's discrimination against these groups in its membership poli-
cies.29 The employer therefore requested" that the union's petition for
an election be denied, arguing that to hold an election" for a discrimi-
nating union would violate the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment.
29
The Board accepted the argument of the-employer with regard to
the due process issue of union membership discrimination on the
basis of race, national origin, and alienage. The Board, however, did
not agree that sex discrimination was as inherently suspect as race,
national origin, and alienage to warrant denial of certification. 0 At
the same time, although the Board appeared to agree with the em-
ployer as to certain of the union's discriminatory actions, it stated
that consideration of certification denial on the basis of invidious
discrimination would have to wait until after the union won elec-
(1974). The reasons why a pre-election hearing is not the proper proceeding are dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 63-72 infra.
21 Brief for Respondent at 29-30, Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. No.
7, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974). The percentages were as follows:
Local 390 Miami Area
Spanish 12.5% 23.6%
Women 12.5% 49.2%
The statistics were based upon information provided in the affidavit of the union
(percentages of the two groups' membership in the union in relation to total union
membership) and by information contained in the General and Social Economic Char-
acteristics of Florida as filed by the U.S. Department of Commerce Social and Eco-
nomics Statistics Administration Bureau of the Census (percentages of the two groups
in the available labor force in relation to the total available labor force). Id.
" Id. at 30. To support this contention, the employer relied upon the statement
in N.L.R.B. v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471, 477 (8th Cir.
1973), that such disparities in statistical evidence can clearly demonstrate discrimina-
tory practices. The applicability of such statistical evidence to support a contention
of union membership discrimination is analyzed in the text accompanying notes 89-
99 infra.
" Brief for Respondent at 30, supra note 25; 86 L.R.R.M. at 1324.
2 See note 24 supra, for procedures leading to an election and considerations
involved in a pre-election hearing.
" Brief for Respondent at 30, supra note 25. Although the employer did not ex-
pressly argue that due process would be violated, reference was made to the principles
involved in N.L.R.B. v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471 (8th
Cir. 1973). The Mansion House decision premised the argument of not making avail-
able procedures of the N.L.R.B. to a violative union on fifth amendment due process
grounds. Id. at 472-73.
1 86 L.R.R.M. at 1330 n.29, 1332. See note 88 infra.
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tion . 3 The Board acknowledged in the majority and concurring opin-
ions that as an agency of the federal government its actions were
limited by the due process clause of the fifth amendment.32 However,
the Board reasoned that only by conferring the benefits of certifica-
tion upon a union engaged in invidious discrimination would the
power of the Federal Government "appear to be sanctioning, and
indeed furthering, the continued practice of such discrimination,
thereby running afoul of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment."
33
The Board's statement is well reasoned and is supported by court
decisions which have held various government agencies to be in viola-
tion of the due process clause when those agencies "indirectly" 3' or
through "knowing acquiescence" 35 support racial discrimination.
3 6 If
the NLRB failed to inquire into charges of racial discrimination in
the union's membership policies or ignored such discriminatory poli-
cies, the NLRB would be "indirectly" or with "knowing acquiesc-
ence" permitting the union to continue such practices with the added
protection of certification.37 The Board sought to assume its constitu-
tional duty by stating that it would consider charges of discrimina-
tion after election of a union but before certification.3 8 The effect of
permitting such membership discrimination is to limit a minority
individual's exercise of liberty. However, if a proper government
objective can be shown, it is possible for an agency to justify apparent
31 Id. at 1327, 1330.
32 Id. at 1325, 1329-30. See note 10 supra. See also Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak,
343 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1952), where the Supreme Court stated that although the due
process clause is not applicable to private persons, due process considerations proscribe
recognition or aid to any such private discrimination by an agency or arm of the federal
government. This limitation is placed upon the NLRB as part of the federal govern-
ment. See NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 141 (1971).
13 86 L.R.R.M. at 1325. See id. at 1330.
3' Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
I Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 737 (7th Cir. 1971).
31 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 969 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
Such indirect or knowingly acquiescent support of discrimination on the basis of alien-
age or national origin would also be violative of the fifth amendment. National origin
and alienage, like race, are invidious forms of discrimination, and therefore are logi-
cally subject to the same close judicial scrutiny as established by the decisions in
Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971), and Green v. Connally, 330 F.
Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nor. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). See note 7
supra.
3' Bekins, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1330, 1332-33.
38 Id. at 1327, 1330.
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discriminatory practices.39 The Supreme Court set forth the require-
ments necessary to defend against a charge of discrimination in re-
gard to employment practices" in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.4' Mr.
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, stated that there must
be a "business necessity" which is "related to job performance" be-
hind any exclusion of minorities.4" Furthermore, if there is an overrid-
ing business purpose that justifies such discrimination, there must
also be no acceptable alternative plan to effectuate the same business
purpose without discrimination.43 There can be no valid government
objective in certifying a union which invidiously discriminates in its
membership policies." Where membership or employment exclusion
is merely premised on arbitrary and artificial barriers such as race
and sex,45 the exclusion fails to fall within the "business necessity"
test. " Therefore, certification should properly be denied a union
which discriminates in its membership policies because of the pros-
cription on individual freedom that such discriminatory practices
represent.
The first noteworthy application of these principles in regard
to racial discrimination in labor unions emerged from the decision of
the Eighth Circuit in NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management
Corp. 1 In Mansion House, the Eighth Circuit denied enforcement of
a Board order requiring an employer to bargain with a union practic-
ing racial discrimination in its membership policies.4 8 As the Mansion
House court stated, "membership in a union is often the sine qua non
for obtaining employment in most skilled crafts in the country; it
3, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
1* These requirements apply to unions because of the direct employment benefit
that union membership gives an employee in terms of bargaining power with an em-
ployer. United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 460 F.2d 497, 503 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972); Local 189, United Papermakers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980, 989 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). See also
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
" 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
2 Id. at 431.
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), petition for cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652,
662 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); Local 819, United Paperworkers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980, 989 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
" Discrimination created or supported by the federal government on the basis of
race, alienage, or national origin is uniformly rejected. See cases cited in note 7 supra.
" For discussion on sex discrimination issues see note 88 infra.
" Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
' 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
"Id. at 475.
1975]
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frequently spells the difference between lucrative employment and
exclusion from the craft."49 Thus, a union which discriminates in
membership on the basis of arbitrary considerations such as race
deprives the excluded minorities of employment opportunities and
benefits."' Although the Eighth Circuit in Mansion House was con-
fronted with an unfair labor practice charge5' brought against an
employer by a certified union, the court concluded generally that
"[flederal complicity through recognition of a discriminating union"
violates basic constitutional principles.12 Therefore, the court denied
enforcement of an NLRB order directing the employer to refrain from
an unfair labor practice. Availability of the remedial machinery and
procedures of the NLRB to the union constituted "federal complic-
ity" in union discrimination. 3 Therefore, if the certification processes
of the Board, by conferring benefits upon the union in the final act
of certification itself,54 constitute "federal complicity" then Mansion
House supports the decision of the Board in Bekins.
The Eighth Circuit in Mansion House referred to a prior NLRB
decision, Independent Metal Workers, Local 1, 5 to define its "federal
complicity" proposition. In Independent Metal Workers, the Board
11 Id. at 472.
5o Id.
5, An unfair labor practice charge may be brought before the Board for any unfair
labor practice enumerated in § 8 of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970). 29 U.S.C. §160
(1970). In Mansion House, the unfair labor practice charge was brought by the union
against the employer for the latter's refusal to bargain in violation of § 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
1' 473 F.2d at 477. Jurisdiction over the issue of whether an employer could be
required by the Board to bargain with a union that discriminates in membership
policies was expressly reserved from a prior decision, NLRB v. Mansion House Center
Management Corp., 466 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1972), involving the same parties.
In the later Mansion House decision, 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973), a violation of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment was recognized even though that amend-
ment, unlike the fourteenth amendment, has no equal protection clause. The Eighth
Circuit decision in Mansion House and prior decisions of the Supreme Court reasoned
that discrimination may be so invidious as to be tantamount to a violation of due
process concepts. Id. at 473; see Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the fifth
amendment and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prescribe
the same limitation on federal and state action in situtations analogous to Bekins.
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, 372 U.S. 714, 721
(1963).
473 F.2d at 477.
u See text accompanying notes 69-72 infra, discussing that the final act of certifi-
cation itself represents "federal complicity." Such complicity should not be recognized
in the hearing and elections procedures leading to certification.
147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
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was confronted with the problem of two locals with racially segre-
gated memberships representing employees of the same plant. The
Board concluded that the certifications of both locals should be res-
cinded. The basis for the rescission was the denial of eligibility for full
and equal membership caused by the racial segregation of the mem-
ber employees. Although the Board was not confronted with a request
for new certification, it stated that unions which exclude employees
from membership on racial grounds could not obtain or retain certi-
fied status under the NLRA. 8 The decision expressly overruled prior
decisions of the NLRB holding that certification could issue to or be
retained by discriminatory unions.5 7 Because the Mansion House
court utilized this decision to explicate its use of the term "federal
complicity,"5 it established a precedent from which the Board in
Bekins could and did logically extrapolate its reasoning to deny certi-
fication to a union guilty of invidious discrimination in membership
practices. In combining the general principles of due process men-
tioned in prior cases 9 with the more explicit language of Mansion
House in regard to NLRB complicity in racially discriminatory mem-
bership practices, the holding ii Bekins appears to be'appropriate.
The importance of the Board's decision can in part be measured
by the benefits which are denied to a union barred from certification.
As the NLRB has stated, 0 certification gives a union stability, secu-
rity, and permanency in its bargaining position with an employer.
Normally, other unions are prevented from challenging the majority
status given to a union by its election and certification for a period
of one year." Under the holding in Bekins, these benefits are denied
a violative union, and thus subject its status as bargaining represent-
ative to challenges from other unions for the right to represent groups
of employees. Also, in light of the disruption to the organizing activi-
ties of employees or unions that denial of certification can represent,
employer challenges to certification are likely to increase. 2 Therefore,
employers can seriously affect union representation if proof of mem-
-Id. at 1578.
"Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 973 (1945). Laurus and Brothers, Co.,
62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945). Other relevant decisions of the Board include Pioneer Bus
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962); Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953). See also
Coleman Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 120 (1952) which recognized the relevancy of racial dis-
crimination in determining certification status and the benefits proscribed under the
NLRA in regard to a discriminating union.
473 F.2d at 473.
See notes 32, 34-36 supra.
38 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 56 (1973).
I Id.
8 See note 22 supra.
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bership discrimination in each case is sufficient to convince the Board
that it cannot constitutionally certify such a union. Questions re-
main, however, as to when and by what procedures charges of dis-
crimination in membership policies may be raised.
In Bekins, the employer challenged the right of a discriminatory
union to seek an election or, in the alternative, to be certified at a
pre-election hearing. However, the majority of the Board declared
that a precertification inquiry need not be made at the original hear-
ing before election. Only after the union involved has received a ma-
jority of the valid votes cast will the Board consider such an objec-
tion. 3 Although agreeing that the question of a union's representative
status should be acted upon expeditiously, the Board, citing its in-
creasing caseload and limited resources, deemed it unwise to tax
itself by considering the issue at the pre-election hearing." Addition-
ally, the Board recognized that if the union failed to receive a major-
ity of valid votes cast, the question of denying certification would be
rendered moot. 5 Finally, the Board believed that the information
provided in a post-election hearing by a Hearing Officer would be of
greater benefit to the Board:
Unlike the original pre-election hearing, a post-election hear-
ing can. . .culminate in the issuance of a report and recom-
mendations by a Hearing Officer, and affords the parties an
opportunity to file exceptions and briefs. Limiting the litiga-
tion of the disqualification issue on the post-election hearing
would thus give us the benefit of credibility resolutions, where
needed, and recommendations; and at the same time, the liti-
gants' rights to procedural due process would be fully pro-
tected.
6 6
The question arises, however, as to whether due process compels
a determination of the status of the union at the pre-election stage.
Although the Board concluded that it would be unconstitutional to
make certification available to a discriminatory union, the Board did
not give close scrutiny to whether the governmental functions per-
' 86 L.R.R.M. at 1327.
I d.
6' In fact, this was the situation that resulted in the subsequent election proceed-
ings concerning Local 390 of the Teamsters Union, the local invoved in Bekins. Local
390 lost the election by a vote of 34 to 9 and therefore, a post-election hearing to
consider the question of denying certification because of racial and sexual discrimina-
tion became unnecessary. Letter from T. Moore, Office of the General Coun-
sel-National Labor Relations Board to Thomas Pace, Washington, D.C., Sept. 10,
1974.
11 86 L.R.R.M. at 1327.
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formed at the pre-election stage for the union could be sufficient
"federal complicity" to justify a constitutional claim.
7
The Board actually confers no substantial benefits on a union
until the final act of certification itself. Therefore, it appears that the
Board neither aids nor recognizes discriminatory membership prac-
tices by making its pre-certification procedures available to a poten-
tially discriminatory union. As the Supreme Court noted in Inland
Empire District Council v. Millis,"5 by granting certification the
Board acts conclusively. All procedures before certification, such as
hearings and elections, are preliminary and tentative. 9 Thus, as long
as procedural due process is provided the parties involved, the ques-
tion of the Board aiding or abetting a discriminatory union in viola-
tion of substantive due process should not arise until the certification
stage, where substantial federal benefits will be conferred. 0 Substan-
tive due process proscriptions should not affect the preliminary
means that the Board choses to utilize in ascertaining the validity of
granting certification to a union. Due to demands upon the resources
of the Board 7' and the lack of ripeness of the issue before a union wins
an election, the decision in Behins to utilize a post-election hearing




" 325 U.S. 697 (1945).
"Id. at 710.
' See note 21 supra.
7I The number of representation cases before the NLRB in fiscal year 1973 in-
creased by 3 percent over fiscal year 1972 to a total of 14,590. Representation cases
concern, inter alia, petitions for decertification, union-shop deauthorization, amend-
ment of certification, and unit clarification. The total caseload for the NLRB for fiscal
year 1973 was a record 41,077.38 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 6, 14 (1973). Thus, representation
cases comprised about one-third of the total cases that the Board considered. Any
unnecessary increase in the number of representation cases, which could result if union
membership discrimination charges are permitted before a union wins an election,
would therefore add substantially to the case burden that already confronts the NLRB.
" 86 L.R.R.M. at 1328. Ostensibly it would seem appropriate that both an em-
ployer and a victim of discriminatory policies would have a right to bring a charge
against a union to bar certification. The Board expressly stated that an employer has
the right to bring an objection to certification on the basis of union membership
discrimination policies. Id. The Board also provided that § 102.69 of the Board's Rules
and Regulations established the procedures to be followed for bringing any such objec-
tion. Id. Under § 102.69 a Board agent may also bring a charge contesting the validity
of union certification. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (1974). A Board agent is defined as "any
member, agent, or agency of the Board, including its general counsel." 29 C.F.R. §
102.2 (1974). Any objection must be filed with the appropriate Regional Director within
five days of the tally of election ballots. 29 C.F.R. 169(a) (1974).
The right of a victim of such discrimination to initiate a charge is not clearly
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established within the Board's Rules and Regulations, since a victim is not usually a
"party" in the context of representation matters. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 169(a) and 102.8
(1974). However, under § 102.8 the Board is given wide discretion to determine who
may be considered a party, and thus who may bring a charge against a union. 29 C.F.R.
§ 169(a) (1974). "[Any person filing a charge or petition under the act [NLRA]"
may be deemed a party and thus permit the valid filing of such a charge. 29 C.F.R.
§§ 102.8 and 102.69(a) (1974). Under § 102.65, provision is made also for intervention
by any person with a sufficient interest in regard to or objections to election proceed-
ings. 29 C.F.R. § 102.65(b) (1974).
It seems unjustified for a prospective employee, denied membership on invidious
grounds, to be required to rely upon the employer to raise the issue, and then seek
intervention. Therefore, with its broad discretionary powers the Board should grant a
victim "party" status to assert a charge of membership discrimination. The Board does
not have affirmative power to correct such discrimination before certification or before
recognition of the union by the employer as exclusive bargaining agent. See Bekins
Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323, 1325; text accompany-
ing notes 161-167. To deny the victim indirect relief from discrimination such as denial
of certification would tend to prevent any remedy for the victim under the NLRA until
after certification occurs or until the employer first initiates an objection to certifica-
tion.
Despite this remedial structure of the NLRA, the individual denied membership
is not completely remediless. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the victim may
initiate an action against the union. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (Supp. 11, 1973) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organiza-
tion-
(1) to exclude or to expel from membership, or otherwise
to discriminate against, any individual because of his race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segreate, or classify its membership or appli-
cants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer
to employment any individual, in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities, or would limit such employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee
or as an applicant for employment, because of an individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discrimi-
nate against an individual in violation of this section.
Id.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. 11, 1973) provision is made for the filing of a charge
by a victim of discrimination against any labor organization violating § 2000e-2(c). The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) then decides if reasonable
cause exists to believe that the charge is true. The EEOC then notifies any state
authorities who oversee state unlawful employment practices, if the practice leading
to the charge occurs within such state. After providing such state aurthorities a reason-
able time (not less than 60 days) to act under state law to remedy the practice alleged,
the EEOC then attempts to work out a conciliation agreement with the violative labor
organization. If within 30 days after the charge is filed or after a reasonable period
passes for a state authority to act, the EEOC does not secure from the labor organiza-
tion a conciliation agreement that is satisfactory, then a civil suit in the appropriate
federal district court may be filed. If it is found by the court that the labor organization
intentionally engaged or intentionally is engaging in an unlawful employment practice,
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A further consideration concerning the denial of certification is
the amount and type of evidence of discrimination in union member-
ship practices necessary to invoke such a sanction by the Board. Of
critical importance is the usefulness of statistical evidence of the type
that the employer in Bekins proffered. 3 The question necessarily in-
volves balancing the national interest in furthering the employees'
wishes to organize with a similar interest in preventing denial of
individual rights on arbitrary and invidious grounds by a discrimina-
tiory union. In Bekins, the Board purposely declined to outline stan-
dards of evidence sufficient to disqualify a union from certification.74
The Board acknowledged75 its inexperience in this newly developing
area of labor law. For this reason the Board chose to deal with these
issues on a case by case basis rather than attempt to codify, in its
rule-making role,76 a substantive test 6f evidence sufficient to bar
certification.7 7 However, on the basis of Bekins and subsequent
NLRB decisions it is possible to ascertain the nature and quality of
evidence which apparently would be sufficient to preclude certifica-
tion.
In reference to the drastic nature of denying certification to a duly
elected union the Board in Bekins acknowledged that it would not
consider "every possible alleged violation of Title VII... as grounds
for refusing to issue a certification." 78 The NLRB recognized that
correction of such "statutory violations" of the Civil Rights Act79 will
often be better left to the scrutiny of other agencies." The concurring
the court may enjoin the labor organization from such a practice and take affirmative
action to aid the victim. Such affirmative action includes, but is not limited to, admis-
sion or reinstatement to the labor organization, with or without back pay if applicable,
and any other equitable relief deemed appropriate. However, if any other reason than
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin forms the basis for exclusion, no relief may
or can be granted. Id.
See note 25 supra.
7, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1327.
75 Id. The Board stated,
[W]e have concluded that we are not yet sufficiently experienced in
this newly developing area of the law to enable us to codify. . . our
approach to such issues. . . .Courts of appeals have . ..differed
with our approach to these matters, and the Supreme Court has, as
yet, had little opportunity to clarify. . . our role in this area ...
Id.
76 Authority in the Board to make rules and regulations arises under 29 U.S.C. §§
151-168 (1970); see 29 C.F.R. § 102.135 (1974).
7 86 L.R.R.M. at 1327.
7' Id. at 1326.
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (Supp. m, 1974); see note 72 supra.
Sh The EEOC is the proper agency to handle violations of the Civil Rights Act.
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opinion agreed,8 but further stated that only constitutional issues
should be considered, leaving any statutory issues concerning the
NLRB to post-certification procedures and any Title VII issues to the
EEOC's jurisdiction entirely. 2 In light of the Board's position that it
was proscribed by constitutional considerations from certifying a vio-
lative union,8 3 the concurring opinion's statement that evidence of a
constitutional nature was necessary to prevent certification appears
justified."4 Therefore, the crucial inquiry centers upon the type of
evidence that can be considered as evidence of a constitutional due
process issue in regard to membership discrimination.
In decisions subsequent to Bekins, the Board has clarified this
evidentiary question. In Bell and Howell Co.'5 and Grants Furniture
Plaza, Inc.,8 the Board considered objections of employers to certifi-
cation of unions which allegedly practiced sex discrimination in
membership policies.87 Although these decisions were primarily con-
cerned with the issue of sex discrimination in union membership
policies,8 they helped illustrate the type and sufficiency of evidence
The Board stated that the sanctions that agencies, such as the EEOC, could imple-
ment might be less drastic than the denial of certification, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1326. See
note 72 supra.
"1 86 L.R.R.M. at 1329.
2 Id. at 1330.
13 See text accompanying notes 29-33 supra.
86 L.R.R.M. at 1331.
213 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 87 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1974).
213 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 87 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1974).
" Bell & Howell Co., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 87 L.R.R.M. 1172, 1173 (1974); Grants
Furniture Plaza, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 87 L.R.R.M. 1175, 1176 (1974).
" In Bell & Howell Co., the employer brought a sex discrimination charge against
the union alleging that there were no female members in the union. 87 L.R.R.M. at
1173. The Board stated that disqualification of the union because of alleged sex dis-
crimination in membership practices was not mandated by either the Constitution or
the NLRA. Id. at 1174. The dissenting members in Bekins were two of the three
members of the Board forming a majority in Bell & Howell. Their reasons for denying
the existence of any constitutional issue to bar certification in regard to sex discrimina-
tion were undifferentiated from their reasons in regard to race, alienage, or national
origin discrimination. In all such alleged forms of discrimination, these two members
of the Board, Members Fanning and Penello, believed inquiry should be made only
after certification. Id. at 1173; Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86
L.R.R.M. 1323, 1331-35 (1974). See note 14 and accompanying text supra. The dissent-
ing members in Bell & Howell were two members of the Board forming part of the
majority on the union membership issue in Bekins. See notes 11-12 and accompanying
text supra. In their dissent in Bell & Howell, however, these two members viewed the
issue of sex discrimination as a constitutional violation of the duty of fair representa-
tion, not as a constitutional violation in regard to membership discrimination. 87
L.R.R.M. at 1175. Only the concurring member of the Board in both Bekins and Bell
& Howell confronted the issue of sex discrimination in regard to membership policies
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as a basis to deny certification. Id. at 1174-75; see Bekins, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1330 n.29.
By finding sex discrimination, unlike race, national origin, or alienage, not to be a
constitutional issue in regard to union membership policies, Member Kennedy helped
form the majority in Bell & Howell.
Member Kennedy stated that unlike race, alienage, and national origin, discrimi-
nation upon the basis of sex has not been determined by the Supreme Court to be
"inherently suspect" as a due process violation. 87 L.R.R.M. at 1174. The opinion
reasoned that "the Board must satisfy its constitutional responsibilities in a manner
which will least interfere with the procedures by which employees select a bargaining
representative." Id. The conclusion, therefore, was that the Board should consider
issues in the area of union membership discrimination "one step at a time" and
consider only those issues which it is compelled to consider. Since the Supreme Court
deemed that a classification based on sex was not "inherently suspect," the concurring
opinion concluded that the Board was not compelled to consider denying certification.
Id. Member Kennedy also indicated that until the Supreme Court declared sex dis-
crimination "inherently suspect," thus requiring strict judicial scrutiny, the Board
should not undertake the task of considering sex discrimination in union membership
as grounds to disqualify a union. Id. at 1174-75. The same conclusion was reached by
Member Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Grants Furniture Plaza, Inc., 213
N.L.R.B. No. 80, 87 L.R.R.M. 1175, 1177 (1974).
The concurring opinions in Bekins and subsequent decisions above appear myopic
in their reasoning. The dissenting and majority opinions may be even more short-
sighted in their failure to recognize or'consider sex discrimination in the context of
union membership policies as a constitutional issue. Bekins Moving & Storage Co.,
supra. at 1325-26, 1331-35; Bell & Howell, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1173-75; Grants Furniture
Plaza, Inc., 87 L.R.R.M. at 1176-77. The concurring opinion in Bell & Howell stated
that an agency of the federal government need not "strike at all evils at the same
time," but may one step at a time address itself to problems which seem most acute.
87 L.R.R.M. at 1174. However, the Fifth Circuit decision relied upon to support this
proposition, Ray Ballie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974), dealt with an agency's attempt specifically to aid
disadvantaged persons, not deprive them of opportunities to better their social and
economic position. In the Fifth Circuit decision, the Small Business Administration
(SBA) attempted to channel funds to disadvantaged minorities in their quests to start
businesses. This maneuver was challenged on the grounds that such action was dis-
criminatory towards other groups or persons seeking loans who did not fall within the
disadvantaged minority category. The challenge was also raised on the premise that
such action by the SBA was outside the scope of its discretionary powers. Id. at 701.
The Fifth Circuit stated that such a program was within the discretionary powers of
the SBA even though it represents only one step toward the overall purpose of aiding
all persons with small business interests. In this context, the court said reform may
take only one step at a time. Id. at 704-05. Thus, the concurring opinion in Bell &
Howell attempted to use a rationale meant to aid minorities to deny women similar
aid in the labor field by rejecting sex discrimination considerations as a basis to bar
certification.
The concurring opinion's reasoning contravenes decisions of the Supreme Court
that state there must be a reasonable basis for distinctions based solely upon sex. In
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the Supreme Court unanimously found
two federal statutes unconstitutional because the sole justification for discrimination
against women was "administrative convenience." Id. at 688. See 37 U.S.C. §§ 401,
403 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 111, 1973) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 7, 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-649, §§ 401, 403, 76 Stat. 469-73); 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 (1970)
(originally enacted as Act of September 2, 1958, ch. 55, §§ 1072, 1076, 72 Stat. 1446-
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of discrimination based upon race, alienage, or national origin, that
the Board will recognize as requiring denial of certification.
In both decisions, the employers offered statistical data to sub-
stantiate charges of membership discrimination by the unions. 9 Fur-
thermore, in Grants Furniture Plaza, the employer submitted a copy
of a Justice Department complaint which alleged that the National
Master Freight Agreement of the Teamsters" perpetuated prior dis-
criminatory practices of the union.9 The employer alleged that since
47). These two statutes provided respectively for an increased increment of pay for
living quarters and for medical and dental care expenses to a member of the armed
services with a spouse. However, a female member of the armed services who supported
her spouse was not eligible to receive increased benefits. The Court found the denial
based upon the mere convenience of not having to process female members requests
an insipid distinction. 411 U.S. at 690-91. Furthermore, the Supreme Court decision
in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353-55 (1974), relied upon by the concurring opinion
in Bell & Howell to support its position, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1174, found a legitimate reason
to permit discrimination in favor of women to receive a state tax exemption on the
basis that women were not able to compete effectively in the job market because of
existing discrimination against women. When the Board in Bell & Howell and prior
decisions failed to consider sex discrimination in union membership policies as a basis
to bar certification on due process grounds, the Board aided and abetted the existing
discrimination against women that Kahn attempted to alleviate. The Board was aiding
discrimination against women, not acting in their favor as did the Court in the Kahn
decision.
The underlying consideration behind the Board's reticence to entertain sex dis-
crimination evidence in certification inquiries appears to be a fear of burdening its
administrative caseload with such cases. However, administrative convenience is not
a valid or reasonable basis to aid or abet classifications based on sex, as stated in
Frontiero. 411 U.S. at 690-91. It would seem reasonable therefore that unless a valid
"business purpose" related to physical ability or capacity, see note 43 and accompany-
ing text supra, or some valid social purpose, see Kahn, 416 U.S. at 355, is involved,
sex discrimination, like discrimination on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin,
should proscribe the Board on due process grounds from conferring certification upon
a union guilty of such practices in its membership. Even if the Board, as the concurring
opinion stated in Bell & Howell, is not to assume the duties of considering Title VII
actions, see note 72 supra, the Board appears to be in contravention of the above
Supreme Court rulings in regard to due process violations resulting from government
participation in sex discrimination which has no justifiable purpose.
0 87 L.R.R.M. at 1173; 87 L.R.R.M. at 1176, n.2.
The employer contended that the Teamster's Master Freight Plan incorporated
a seniority system that continued past discrimination policies against blacks and
Spanish surnamed individuals. It did so by providing that these minorities had to give
up accrued seniority when transferring to the higher paying jobs of long-distance truck
driving from lower-paying local truck driving. The effect was to guarantee that the
minorities would not displace white union members of their long-distance positions
because they had fewer years of service than the minority members had in short-
distance positions. Brief for Respondent at 36, Grants Furniture Plaza, Inc., 213
N.L.R.B. No. 80, 87 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1974).
91 87 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
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Local 390 of the Teamsters Union subscribed to this agreement, Local
390 also could be considered as guilty of discriminatory practices.2
The Board dismissed the usefulness of such evidence alone to support
an objection to certification. 3
The Board found that the Department of Justice complaint was
no more than a mere allegation of wrongdoing that did not constitute
evidence adequate to support an objection, whether in the confines
of a representation hearing or in any other context. 4 The Board stipu-
lated that evidence must consist of facts, not mere allegations: "The
unproven allegations of a complaint, whether filed by an individual
or by a governmental agency do not constitute proof, or even compe-
tent evidence, under well-established rules of evidence."95
Similarly, the use of statistices showing disparities between the
percentages of minorities in a union and of minorities in the sur-
rounding area labor force was deemed, by itself, inadequate to war-
rant even a hearing to consider disqualification." To constitute suffi-
cient evidence, the statistics had to be used in conjunction with other
evidence connecting the union, through a hiring hall or other means,
7
with control over the racial or ethnic composition of those who enter
the labor force, and who thereby are or become union members. The
Board stated that in the absence of such proof, it is assumed that the
employer controls the selection of the labor force, whose members
32 Brief for Respondent at 37, Grants Furniture Plaza, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 80,
87 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1974).
0 87 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
"4 Id.
95 Id.
"Id. The Board stated:
Nor do we find sufficient to warrant a hearing the evidence offered
in the form of statistics purporting to show that the labor organization
seeking certification here has a membership in which certain minority
groups appear in numbers less than the population ratio of such mi-
norities to the total population in the area in which this labor organi-
zation operates.
.. [W e conclude that it would be improper to draw any inferences
of union propensity for discrimination on the sole basis of such statist-
ical evidence in the instant setting.
Id.
"Id. A hiring hall gives the union the duty of selecting applicants for employ-
ment. Often such a duty is given to unions involved in skilled crafts which will usually
require training by the union of the persons it selects for employment. In such a
situation, the union quite clearly controls the employment hiring process. See ABA
LABOR RELATIONS LAW SECrION, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW - THE BOARD, THE COURTS
AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 712-15 (C.J. Morris ed. 1971).
" Grants, L.R.R.M. at 1176.
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then usually either may join or are required to join a union under an
appropriate union-security agreement.9
The Board has not yet indicated the sufficiency of evidence neces-
sary to deny certification to a union actively controlling its member-
ship policies. However, the reasonable inference is that statistics per
se are not objectionable. Rather, to constitute valid evidence of union
membership discrimination statistics must be connected to policies
of the union itself, and not totally ascribable to an employer. Thus,
even where an employer controls the total hiring process, if statistics
along with union by-laws or practices indicate conformity or adher-
ence to discriminatory policies, such a union's certification should be
subject to scrutiny.00 The connection of union by-laws or practices
with statistical evidence of minority imbalances in membership con-
stitutes a prima facie case of union membership discrimination.'
Upon the establishment of such a prima facie case of discrimination,
the burden would fall on the union to overcome it.'
Another evidentiary question in Bekins and Grants Furniture
Plaza concerned ascribing evidence of the national or international
union's discriminatory policies to a local union to deny the latter's
certification. This is particularly relevant to Local 390 which was
involved in both Bekins and Grants Furniture Plaza. Local 390 is a
local union of the InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters whose
99 Id.
110 See the concurring opinion in Bell & Howell Co., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 87
L.R.R.M. 1172, 1174 (1974): "There is no allegation that [the union's] constitution
or bylaws deny membership to females." Id.
"ol See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). In Turner, the Supreme Court found
the substantial disparity between percentages of black residents in a county and of
blacks on a newly constituted jury list to be a prima facie showing of discrimination.
The jury commissioners in charge of the selection process controlled the composition
of the jury list, and were shown to have departed from objective considerations in
formulating the list. Id. at 360. Similarly, if it can be shown that a union departed from
objective criteria in its membership selection process in conjunction with a substantial
disparity between the percentage of minorities in the union membership and of the
surrounding labor force, then a prima facie case of union membership discrimination
would exist. See NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471,
475-77 (8th Cir. 1973).
"02 In Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974),
the Board stated:
If upon a prima facie showing of such an exclusion, the labor organiza-
tion can demonstrate that its recruitment or admission policies are
non-discriminatory then there appears to be no constitutional impedi-
ment to its certification.
Id. at 1330; see Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360 (1970); NLRB v. Mansion House
Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471, 477 (8th Cir. 1973).
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"Master Freight Plan"'' 0 3 has been the center of discrimination
charges in other decisions.0 4 Furthermore, Local 390 was a signatory
party to the Master Freight Plan. ' Where a direct connection can
be made between local union membership policies and such national
agreements, supporting evidence of union membership discrimina-
tion will exist.' 6 Such proof could further substantiate existing evi-
dence of a local union's propensity to discriminate in membership
policies. However, in light of the Grants Furniture Plaza and Bell &
Mowell decisions, the connection between local union and national
or international union practices must be more substantial than a
mere allegation.' 7
Membership discrimination by a union in regard to race, national
origin, and alienage proscribes the Board from certifying a union on
due process grounds. The Board recognized this in Bekins, but re-
fused to include sex discrimination policies within the due process
proscription. With respect to the types of discrimination that the
Board deemed "invidious" under the due process clause, the em-
ployer must overcome the prima facie eligibility of a union for certifi-
cation after victory in an election' 8 by proving that the union has
discriminated in its membership policies. The burden is then trans-
ferred to the union to overcome such a prima facie case by showing
that its admission or recruitment policies are non-discriminatory.0
In light of the extreme importance of certification to a union, it seems
likely that the Bekins decision will serve to encourage non-
discriminatory membership practices by labor unions."'
However, the import of Bekins cannot be restricted to its stand
on membership discrimination, for union membership discrimination
represented only one of two possible "constitutional" issues involved
in the decision."' Two members of the Board, who formed part of the
n See note 90 supra.
"o See, e.g., Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 444 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1971); Jones
v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
954 (1971); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
"I Brief for Respondent at 37, Grants Furniture Plaza, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 80,
87 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1974).
11 See Grants Furniture Plaza, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 87 L.R.R.M. 1175, 1176
(1974).
" As the Board stated, "[e]vidence must consist of facts, not mere accusations
which yet remain to be proven." Id.
I" Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323, 1327
(1974).
Io Id. at 1330; see note 101 supra.
12o See note 164 infra.
"' Before embarking upon analysis of the second possible constitutional issue
involved in Bekins, the duty of fair representation, it seems appropriate to note the
total absence in Bekins of any discussion relating to first amendment rights and union
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membership. The Board failed to take cognizance of numerous cases concerning the
basic "freedom of association" issue in denying union membership to a person on an
arbitrary basis. It should be recognized that, like the fifth amendment, the rights
guaranteed by the first amendment cannot be interferred with nor can interference
with those rights be sanctioned by the federal government or the states. Public Util.
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952) (proscription on federal government);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (proscription on state government).
Also, although first amendment rights are most frequently concerned with political
and civil principles, it is not sound to state that those rights are inapplicable to
business or economic activity. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945). The prerog-
ative to join or to organize a union is such an economic activity. Id. The right to form
or join a union was not originally established by the NLRA. As the Supreme Court
noted, "the right to organize and select representatives for lawful purposes . . . has
[been] characterized as a 'fundamental right' and . . . was recognized as such...
long before it was given protection by the National Labor Relations Act." UAW, Local
232, v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245, 259 (1949), citing NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937). In Jones & Laughlin the Court
cited § 7 of the NLRA (enumerating the basic right of employees to organize, to form,
or to join a labor organization) and stated that the NLRA "goes no further than to
safeguard the right of employees to self-organization. . .. [t]hat is a fundamental
right." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
The policy behind the right of an employee to form or to join a union is that a
single employee is less able to bargain in equal power with an employer. As the Court
stated, "union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with
their employer. . . . [S]uch collective action would be a mockery if representation
were made futile by interference with freedom of choice." Id. at 33-34. (Emphasis
added). Although the Court was referring to the denial of the right to organize or to
join a union by the employer, these principles are logically applicable to denial of union
membership by a union to a person seeking such a membership. This is apparent in
the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
460 F.2d 497 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972).
In enforcing the merger of two segregated locals into one integrated local, which
both officials of the black and white locals opposed, the Fourth Circuit stated:
The order does no more than prohibit exclusion from association on
the ground of race. There is no warrant in the Constitution for a union
to retain, even by majority preference, racially segregated locals that
tend to deprive some black members of equal employment opportuni-
ties...
The district court's order does not conflict with NAACP v.
Alabama and Thomas v. Collins on which the union primarily relies.
These cases do not create a right in white men or black men to avoid
association with persons of other race. On the contrary they are lead-
ing authorities charting the right of all persons to associate for politi-
cal and economic goals. (Citations omitted).
Id. at 501. (Emphasis added). First amendment protection of the right to join a union
was recognized by decisions of various district courts as well. Bateman v. South Caro-
lina State Ports Authority, 298 F. Supp. 999, 1003 (D.S.C. 1969); Atkins v. City of
Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
Thus, the NLRB, as an agency of the federal government, is proscribed from
interfering with or aiding the interference of a person's right of association to join a
union. The same tests which govern exceptions to due process violations should be
applicable to possible freedom of association violations. See text accompanying notes
42-46 supra. Recognition of these first amendment considerations in Bekins would have
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majority in Bekins, believed that evidence of a union's discrimination
in regard to members or membership practices violated the union's
duty of fair representation.1 12 These members concluded that the duty
of fair representation was constitutional in nature, separate and dis-
tinct from the constitutional issue involved in union membership
discrimination."
3
However, the concurring and dissenting opinions disagreed with
the position that the duty of fair repesentations was constitutional.
Instead, these members of the Board stated that the duty was statu-
torily derived from the NLRA.114 Unlike the opinion, which suggested
that a breach of the duty of fair representation warranted denial of
certification on constitutional grounds,115 the concurring and dissent-
ing opinions, which formed the majority on this issue, believed that
such a breach should be considered only after certification."'
Whether the duty of fair representation is constitutional or non-
constitutional is, therefore, critical to any determination as to when
the claim may be raised. If the duty is constitutional, then the basis
for denying certification is expanded to include not only membership
discrimination, but also discrimination against present members or
further substantiated the necessity and justification of denying certification to a union
which invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, alienage, or national origin
in membership policies.
" Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323; 1326
(1974); see note 12 supra.
" 86 L.R.R.M. at 1326. The two members of the Board ascribing a constitutional
aspect to the duty of fair representation stated:
Nor can we constitutionally certify a union which is shown to
have a propensity to fail fairly to represent employees. Our constitu-
tional considerations may, in this respect, be somewhat broader than
those expressed by Member Kennedy [the concurring member of the
Board]. For we understand the duty of fair representation to be rooted
in the Constitution as well as the statute [NLRAJ.
Id.
"1 Id. at 1330-31, 1332. For a discussion of the differing interpretations between
the concurring and dissenting opinions in regard to whether the duty of fair representa-
tion may ever be constitutional in nature, see note 18 supra.
, See note 113 and accompanying text supra.
" 86 L.R.R.M. at 1330-31, 1332. The concurring opinion stated:
I would not undertake a precertification inquiry with respect to a
potential breach of a union's duty of fair representation. Unlike my
colleagues, I do not consider the duty of fair representation to be a
constitutional obligation. Rather, I view it as an obligation imposed
by a statute as a corollary to a labor organization's being granted
exclusive representative status.
Id. at 1330; see note 17 supra. The dissenting opinion's comments are set out in note
14 supra.
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employees that the union does or is required to represent."7 Also,
issues as to expanded types of evidence and more lenient sufficiency
of evidence rules arise since decisions acknowledge the admissibility
of mere statistical evidence in Title VII cases to support allegations
of unfair representation."' On the other hand, if the duty is non-
constitutional, then consideration of any evidence of a violation of the
duty does not arise until after certification because only constitu-
tional issues can possibly deny certification."'
In asserting the constitutional nature of the duty of fair represen-
tation the two members of the Board in Bekins relied 2 on two court
decisions, Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB 21 and Steele
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. 22 However, analysis of these cases
tends to confirm the opinions of the remaining members of the Board
that the duty of fair representation, in the context of such decisions
as Bekins, '2 is statutory, and not constitutional. For instance, in
United Rubber Workers the Fifth Circuit declared a union's failure
to process union members' grievances in regard to segregated food
and health facilities to be an unfair labor practice.2 4 In declaring the
" See text accompanying notes 144-46 infra.
" See NLRB v. Mansion House Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471, 476-77 (8th
Cir. 1973).
"' See text accompanying notes 9-20 supra.
120 86 L.R.R.M. at 1326. Apparently, consideration of the duty of fair representa-
tion as a constitutional issue emerged from the Board itself, as the employer's brief
stated no such contention specifically. See Brief for Respondent at 29-30, Bekins Mov-
ing & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974). The dissent made
note of this fact in its opinion in questioning the wisdom of the Board's position on
this issue. 86 L.R.R.M. at 1332 n.34.
121 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
1- 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
'2 In the ensuing discussion, it should be remembered that the question raised by
the Board is whether a breach of the duty of fair representation should bar certifica-
tion. The issue is not whether the NLRA provides for such a duty on the part of a
certified or recognized union.
1 368 F.2d at 24. The particular unfair labor practice that the breach of duty of
fair representation resulted in United Rubber Workers was a violation of § 8 (b)(1)(A)
of the NLRA, which states:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 7 [§ 157 of this title. .... 1
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970). Section 157 states the rights and privileges of an
employee in regard to a labor organization:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through represent-
atives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activi-
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breach of the duty of fair representation to be an unfair labor prac-
tice, the court stated that since an employee completely surrenders
his right of self-representation to a bargaining agent, "logic and eq-
uity" demand that such agent have a "reciprocal duty" to represent
fairly any such employee.'2 The court cited Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. for the proposition that if the NLRA did not demand
such a reciprocal duty of the representative, then serious questions
as to the constitutionality of the NLRA itself would arise. 2 The duty
of fair representation per se was not a constitutional issue. Rather,
the absence in the NLRA of any provision for such a duty or remedy
for its breach represented the constitutional issue. This proposition
is supported upon examination of the Supreme Court's decision in
Steele.
The Court in Steele overruled a state court decision which allowed
the bargaining representative to negotiate for employees without a
commensurate duty of fairly representing all of those employees.'
27
The Court explained that either the statute' 21 was unconstitutional
in not providing for such a reciprocal duty or that the state court
erred in failing to enforce the reciprocal duty within the statute. Mr.
Chief Justice Stone stated that Congress, in creating the exclusive
bargaining right in the representative union by statute, implicitly
imposed a reciprocal duty on the union to represent fairly all employ-
ees.' 29 The constitutional issue, whether the statute provided for the
duty of fair representation was therefore resolved in favor of the con-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection ...
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) (emphasis added). The arbitrary denial of grievance procedures
to the employees on the basis of race represented a deprivation of the employees' right
to "bargain collectively through representatives of their choosing." 368 F.2d at 17.
"1 368 F.2d at 16-17.
2n Id.
' The union in Steele discriminated against blacks in terms of making a collec-
tive bargaining agreement that denied the blacks the possibility of promotion to more
lucrative positions with the railroad employer. The bargaining agreement gave white
members of the union priority for the better paying jobs with better working condi-
tions. The Court found this to be a violation of the duty of fair representation imposed
upon the bargaining representative as exclusive bargaining agent for the employees.
323 U.S. at 196-97, 208.
'' Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970). The provisions of this
statute in terms of representative duties and functions are nearly identical to those
under the NLRA. In the present discussion concerning the question of constitutionality
of the duty of fair representation the two statutes are equally applicable. See Local
12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1966). See also notes 129-
30 infra.
In 323 U.S. .198-99. This reasoning was made applicable to the NLRA by the
Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953).
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stitutionality of the statute. The state court was in error for failing
to enforce the reciprocal statutory duty of fair representation. 3 '
Thus, in the context of a pre-certification proceeding as in Bekins,
questions as to a union's violation of the duty of fair representation
should not magically become constitutional in nature. In any chal-
lenge to certification, the Board would still be constrained to deter-
mine if a violation of the statutory duty exists. However, as the Board
recognized, only a constitutional violation proscribes certification.'
It should be further noted that the duty of fair representation only
arises when a union is the exclusive bargaining agent for a group of
employees.'12 Until certification occurs, the union does not derive the
benefit from being established as the exclusive representative.'3
Nevertheless, the argument was raised in Bekins that certification
is not the only means by which a union can become an exclusive
bargaining representative.' 4 Concededly, a union may be recognized
13 323 U.S. at 202-03. The Court said:
We hold that the language of the Act... read in light of the purposes
of the Act, expresses the aim of Congress to impose on the bargaining
representative of a craft or class of employees the duty to exercise
fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it
acts, without hostile discrimination against them.
Id. The statutory nature of the duty of fair representation was further substantiated
in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330,
337 (1953). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1967) where the Court stated:
It is now well established that, as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of the employees ... the Union had a statutory duty to represent
all of those employees, both in collective bargaining ... and in its
enforcement of the resulting collective bargaining agreement ... The
statutory duty of fair representation was developed over 20 years ago
in a series of cases involving racial discrimination by unions certified
as exclusive bargaining representative under the Railway Labor Act
... and was soon extended to unions certified under the
N.L.R.A .... Under this doctrine, the exclusive agent's statutory
authority to represent all members of a designated unit includes a
statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hos-
tility or discrimination toward any....
Id. at 177 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
13, See text accompanying notes 30-46 supra.
132 See note 130 supra.
133 See note 21 supra.
,3, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1326-27. Two members of the Board in the majority stated:
Our colleagues apparently assume that the prohibition against dis-
crimination does not reach a union until it is certified. Steele teaches
us to the contrary, that it is the union's power to bargain for all by
virtue of the statute which brings the prohibition into effect, and the
duty of fair representation has never been limited to certified unions.
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by the employer as the exclusive bargaining agent. ' However, it is
difficult to imagine that an employer would desire to challenge certi-
fication to a union and, at the same time, recognize that union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees. Thus certifica-
tion, in the context of cases like Bekins, would seem to be the only
means for a union to achieve exclusive bargaining representative sta-
tus. Therefore, any issue relating to a breach of duty of fair represen-
tation would seem appropriate only after certification.'36
Two members of the Board in Bekins additionally attempted to
justify consideration of unfair representation issues at the certifica-
tion hearing by contending that a union should not be provided with
further opportunity to represent employees unfairly.' 7 However, as
the Eighth Circuit stated in Mansion House, an employer's claim
that a union should not be certified because the union will commit
future abuses, such as an unfair representation practice,'38 is prema-
ture.'39 "The mere possibility of future abuse is no justification" for
finding a present violation of the NLRA.'4 ' Likewise, a charge of
breach of the duty of fair representation in regard to union member-
ship discrimination is premature.' The duty does not concern those
persons that a union does not yet represent.' Furthermore, since the
Board recognized that only due process considerations warranted
denial of certification, the issue of a potential breach of the statutory
duty of fair representation as to present or prospective employees is
irrelevant to certification considerations.'
As stated previously, the scope of considerations that could lead
to denial of certification will depend upon whether the issue of fair
repesentations is constitutional or non-constitutional. " Since the
duty of fair representation appears to be statutory and arises only
after certification, the grounds for denial of certification should be
In See e.g., United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 71-72
(1956) (authorization cards); NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318, 338-39
(1940) (authorization cards).
I" 86 L.R.R.M. at 1331.
"' Id. at 1326.
In See e.g., the unfair representation issue in Local 12, United Rubber Workers
v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); note 124 and accompanying text supra.
UI 473 F.2d at 472 n.1.
"S Id. citing Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 174, 178 (8th Cir.
1968.)
' See text accompanying notes 127-33 supra.
" 86 L.R.R.M. at 1326. The Board acknowledged that "it can be said that the
[union] lacks the capacity to discriminate against those it does not represent and, in
this sense, a certification imposes additional responsibility." Id.
" See text accompanying notes 24-33, 127-33 supra.
"I See text accompanying notes 122-26 supra.
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narrowed exclusively to evidence of invidious discrimination in union
membership policies.'45 Thus, evidence relevant to a breach of the
duty of fair representation is germane only to an unfair labor practice
charge brought after certification, and not a precertification hearing.
The admissibility of Title VII evidence in regard to unfair representa-
tion practices would appear to be precluded from consideration in a
precertification hearing."'
A final consideration raised by the dissent with respect to both
membership discrimination and fair representation issues involves
the relevancy of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. More precisely, the
question raised with respect to both issues was whether Title VII
undermined action by the NLRB in regard to union discrimination
issues. 4 ' The dissenting members of the Board expressed the belief
that NLRB involvement in proscribing union discrimination in mem-
bership practices would undercut administration of the Civil Rights
Act.' The majority opinion, while expressing concern to avoid en-
croachment upon the congressional mandate behind the EEOC,
stated that the NLRB was not undertaking affirmative corrective
action that the EEOC would provide. 49 The Board, rather than using
injunctive powers, would merely withdraw the availability of its pro-
cesses from a union that was promoting discriminatory practices and
would not be acting affirmatively. 5 ' Therefore as to the constitutional
issues involved in union membership discrimination, the position of
the majority in Bekins is justified since encroachment upon EEOC
jurisdiction does not appear to be a serious consideration. 5'
However, as to a breach of the statutory duty of fair representa-
tion, 5 1 the question of preemption by the Civil Rights Act is consider-
ably more relevant. In United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 3 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia discussed
in detail the non-preemptive nature of the Civil Rights Act with
respect to the NLRA and its unfair representation procedures.'54 As
15 This conclusion leaves to Board consideration in the precertification hearing
only such evidence that pertains to membership discrimination, the type and suffi-
ciency of which was discussed in the text accompanying notes 73-110 supra.
',' See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
, See notes 20 and 72 supra.
"' 86 L.R.R.M. at 1332.
'9 Id. at 1325; see note 72 supra.
"' Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
' See notes 118, 145, and 146 and accompanying text supra.
, See text accompanying notes 15-20 supra.
", 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
,' Id. at 1133-34 n. 11. See also NLRB v. Mansion House Management Corp., 473
F.2d 471, 475-77 (8th Cir. 1973); Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d
12, 24 n.24 (5th Cir. 1966).
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the court stated, there was no language in the Civil Rights Act to oust
the NLRB from jurisdiction over matters relating to discrimination
in labor relations,'5 though Title VII outlines procedures to deal with
employers and unions violating the equal opportunity law.", The
court noted that a Senate amendment was proffered to make the
provisions of Title VII "the exclusive means- of relief for such prac-
tices, depriving 'any department, agency, or instrumentality in the
executive branch of the Government, or any independent agency of
the United States' from granting relief."' 5 However, the amendment
was defeated in a subsequent Senate vote."' The court further ex-
plained that it may be to the advantage of a person aggrieved by
discrimination to use the NLRB rather than the EEOC since the
NLRB bears the expense of enforcing the NLRA, offers general ad-
vantages of administrative enforcement, has a shorter case backlog
time than the federal courts, and has no express requirement to defer
to state agencies."'
The legislative history and the subsequent case law developed
under the NLRA and Civil Rights Act attest to the mutually non-
preemptive nature of those acts.'6' A person who is discriminated
against in either union membership policies or union representation
policies on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin may seek,
relief under the Civil Rights Act."' Discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, religion, or national origin by a union in violation of a duty
"5 416 F.2d at 1133-34 n.11.
01 See note 72 supra.
151 416 F.2d at 1133 n.11 citing 110 CONG. REc. 13,650-52 (1964).
15 Id.
159 416 F.2d at 1133 n.11 citing Rosen, Division of Authority Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Preliminary Study in Federal-State Interagency Relations,
34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 846, 887 (1966).
It should be noted that in 1973, the NLRB regional offices, with which unfair labor
practice complaints are filed, processed cases from date of filing the complaint in a
median of 51 days. 38 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 12 (1973).
Also a victim of unfair representation may simultaneously file petitions for relief
before the EEOC and NLRB for the same violation. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal
Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529, 531-32 (S.D. Tex. 1972). However, where a complaint is filed
with the EEOC or the NLRB and an adverse decision is rendered, the complainant is
barred from subsequently bringing the same charge before the other agency. Hutchings
v. United States Indus., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 691, 693 (E.D. Tex. 1969).
The availability of multiple forums provides not only protection for the individual
employee, but also tends to enhance vindication of the public policy to see that Title
VII and labor relations violations are corrected. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 (1974); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
I" United Packinghouse v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see text accom-
panying notes 153-58 supra.
"I See note 72 supra.
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of fair representation appears subject to the remedial procedures of
the NLRB as well."6 2 However, as to discrimination in union member-
ship policies, the basis upon which action will be taken appears to
be limited to racial or ethnic issues' and results only in the denial
of certification. There is no specific relief for the victim per se before
the NLRB in regard to union membership discrimination, since an
employer or Board agent' 4 are the only parties which clearly have
standing to initiate action against a union. However, even though the
victims of such discrimination may fail to receive direct relief in such
actions,6 5 the threat of denial of certification to a union may have the
ultimate effect of terminating such discrimination."' Unions may
well prefer to end discriminatory membership policies rather than
suffer the setback of disqualification."7
The decision in Bekins represents the opening of a broad new field
of inquiry for the NLRB. The Board in Bekins appeared to be justi-
fied in finding a due process prohibition on the NLRB to certify a
union discriminating on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin
in membership policies."8 However, in attempting to establish the
duty of fair representation as a constitutional issue, certain members
of the Board seemed to have misinterpreted the basic statutory na-
ture of the duty of fair representation. The duty cannot exist, as the
concurring opinion stated, until the benefit of exclusive representa-
tion is received through certification. "' Therefore, any evidence of
violations of the duty of fair representation should be considered only
after certification is conferred and cannot be used as a basis to deny
certification.'
,62 87 L.R.R.M. at 1117; 86 L.R.R.M. at 1330-31.
,63 86 L.R.R.M. at 1329; see note 7 supra.
6 See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
' "Direct relief" applies to such remedies as those within the power of the courts
under the Civil Rights Act to order a labor organization to accept into its membership
a person excluded on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and to
make available other appropriate relief. See note 72 supra.
M6 As noted by Dean Sovern, nothing could prevent the unions from striking to
force an employer to bargain with them when the unions have the majority support of
a group of employees. However, pressures from the international and national unions
could force any violative local unions into line. Such pressure might be exerted because
of the disruptive effect on organizational activities that denial of certification repre-
sents. In the face of such disruption, compliance with non-discriminatory procedures
would prove the easier alternative. Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and
Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLum. L. Rxv. 563, 607-08 (1962).
167 Id.
" 86 L.R.R.M. at 1325, 1329. See also note 88 supra concerning the issue of sex
discrimination in regard to denial of certification.
16 See text accompanying notes 112-133 supra.
, See text accompanying notes 144-46 supra.
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With disqualification of a union from certification on the basis of
invidious discrimination in membership policies, increased chal-
lenges from employers is a certainty.' The Board has however,
within its discretion the right to dismiss such a charge when the claim
appears frivolous or without factual substance.' 22 However the num-
ber of legitimate charges will increase until unions respond affirma-
tively and terminate any discriminatory membership practices.
THoMAs PACE
' See note 22 supra.
'T 29 C.F.R. § 102.67 (1974).

